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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns the central question of whether a report to law enforcement 0f

domestic Violence, subjects the reporter t0 a
protected

civil

defamation claim or Whether such reports are

by an absolute or qualiﬁed privilege. The Court

in this case refused to recognize either

privilege as applying and therefore not only permitted the claim t0 proceed to the jury, but failed

to instruct

on the additional element of malice

that

would apply

to a qualiﬁed privilege. Finally,

the appeal questions the applicability of a defamation per se jury instruction

was

where the

Plaintiff

relieved 0f having t0 prove damages.

2.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff,

civil

(Appellee

Duane “Siercke”) ﬁled a

civil

complaint for defamation, wrongful

proceedings and abuse 0f process against his eX-wife, the Defendant (Appellant Analli

“Salla”). (R. pp. 2, 16-28). Salla counterclaimed for battery

emotional

and intentional inﬂiction of

distress. (R. pp. 5, 29-39).

In the course of the parties’ pre-trial compliance, both parties submitted their proposed

jury instructions to the Court. Siercke ﬁled his proposed instructions on June 18, 2018. (R. pp.
54-90).

On June 20,

2018, Salla ﬁled her written objections t0 Plaintiff” s proposed jury

and

his defamation per se

Salla’s 911 call, report t0

law enforcement and

instructions, including her objections to Siercke’s defamation claims

jury instruction. (R. pp. 92-96).
Siercke’s defamation claim centered

later to a

her.

on

prosecutor and counselor that Siercke had committed acts of domestic Violence against

The Defendant argued

that

such statements were entitled t0 absolute privilege and she

objected to a defamation per se jury instruction. (R. 92-97). The Court did not afford any form of

privilege to the statements and instructed the jury

0n defamation per

se over Defendant’s

objections. (R. 127, 131-133).

After a ﬁve-day jury

defamation claim against

trial in

Salla.

March 2019,

the jury denied

The jury awarded damages

all

claims except Siercke’s

t0 Siercke, according to a

instruction that did not require that he establish that Salla’s statements

were made

in

defamation

bad

faith 0r

with malice. The jury’s damage award in the amount 0f $25,000 was instructed by a defamation
per se instruction that did not require any proof 0f damages. The

Judgment

in accordance With the jury’s verdict

On April 22,

which denied the motion on June 21, 2019.

its

(R. pp. 14, 156-164.) After

Order 0n Defendant’s Motion for a

p. 14).

New Trial

Amended

This appeal follows Defendant’s Second

15, 2019. (R. p. 15).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March

(Salla),

New Trial.

(R. pp. 14, 165-179). Defendant ﬁled her

Notice of Appeal herein 0n July 18, 2019. (R.

Amended Notice 0f Appeal ﬁled 0n August

its

entered

10, 2019. (R. 154-155).

2019, Defendant ﬁled her Motion for

hearing 0n the motion, the district court entered

3.

0n April

district court

7,

2016, Appellee, Duane Siercke (Sierkce) and Appellant, Annali Salla

then husband and Wife and parents 0f two young children, both called 911 t0 report an

incident of domestic Violence. (Tr. Ballman, p. 10).

They had been discussing a possible divorce

and the custody 0f the children when Salla reported

that Siercke

head and tore an earring from her

ear,

causing her ear to bleed.

County Sheriff Deputy Ballman responded with another ofﬁcer
separately interviewed both Salla and Siercke.

had grabbed her Violently by the

(Id.,

pp. 10, 16). Kootenai

t0 the scene

and both ofﬁcers

Deputy Ballman found Siercke calm and

apparently in control of his emotions, behavior consistent With Deputy Ballman’s experiences in
interviewing controlling, domestic abusers.

(1d,, p. 30).

Siercke alleged that Salla

was “framing”

him and he had not touched her

(1d,, p. 11).

“crying, very emotionally distraught.

anything.”

earlobes.”

(Id., p. 23).

(Id.).

.

.at

Deputy Ballman

Deputy Ballman found

Salla “very, very upset”

times had a hard time articulating pretty

also noticed that “she

and

much

had blood coming out of her

Consistent with his training and experience in domestic Violence, he found Salla

not wanting Siercke t0 be arrested and not wanting t0 share the audio recording of their physical

encounter that Salla had recorded.
parties

(Id.).

After the on-scene investigation, interviews with both

and the children, and a review of Salla’s recording 0f the incident, Deputy Ballman made

the decision t0 arrest Siercke for domestic Violence With traumatic injury in the presence of a

child.1 (Id., p. 3 1).

Deputy Ballman testiﬁed

that

he completed and ﬁled his probable cause

afﬁdavit in support 0f his arrest and sent his reports to the Prosecuting Attorney

whether or not to ﬁle a criminal complaint.
Siercke

was charged. The decision

(1d,, p. 34).

(Id., p. 37).

to arrest

Deputy Ballman believed

Salla

made n0

who

decided

decision 0n Whether or not

and request charges were made by Deputy Ballman.

that Salla actually asked

him not

to arrest or charge

Siercke. (Id.)

Siercke testiﬁed as follows regarding his monetary claim and damages. That because 0f
Salla’s report to

law enforcement and prosecutors and his subsequent

and criminal charges

that

he “had t0 pay,

ofjail. (Siercke Tr. at 59).

He

also

had

I

to hire

bond out

an attorney to represent him on the criminal

a result of the criminal charges, but testiﬁed “I can’t

While Deputy Ballman arrested

overnight at the jail

think $500, 0r something 0f that nature” to

charges and subsequent divorce complaint ﬁled by Salla.

1

arrest,

(Id., p. 60).

Siercke had to miss

remember exactly how many.

.

.it

work

as

wasn’t a

for domestic Violence With traumatic injury, the arrest led t0 a

County Prosecutor of misdemeanor domestic battery and the
The
trial court did not distinguish between a felony and misdemeanor criminal charge in its
defamation per se instruction No. 6 (R., p. 127).
criminal complaint

trial

by

the Kootenai

court instructed the jury 0n the elements of misdemeanor domestic battery. (R., p. 129).

large

number though.”

(1d,, p. 61).

Siercke also testiﬁed that he lost sleep and went t0 counseling

and because 0f the criminal n0 contact order could not see

were issued

was going

t0 ask for $50,000.

t0 ask, considering all the circumstances

damage amounts Siercke

.

.I

think that’s a fair amount,

examination and over Defendant’s objections.

He

(1d,, p.

Though

fair

amount

lost

came

in during re-direct

155-156). Siercke testiﬁed that he had paid

income

in the

he testiﬁed that his $50,000 damages claim included

income and counseling

more than

damages,

of myself and 0f my eX-Wife.” The only speciﬁc

testiﬁed to outside of the $500 bond,

his counselor “over $800.” (Id., p. 156).

temporary orders

When asked about his

in the divorce case in August, 2017. (Id., pp. 61-65).

Siercke said “I

Finally,

his children until

amount of $1,300.

all

(Id., p. 180).

three of his claims and the lost

costs. (Id.).

Plaintiff had

mentioned in his direct testimony

the divorce and the criminal charges, these claims

that

he had t0 hire an attorney for

had been precluded as adjudicated

in a prior

proceeding. (R., p. 176).

Notwithstanding that the focus of Plaintiff’ s defamation claims involved Salla’s report to

law enforcement of domestic Violence, the Court did not

instruct the jury

on any form of

privilege to be afforded Salla’s statements, nor did the Court require the Plaintiff to establish any

additional elements 0f proof. (R., p.1 16- 1 53). Indeed, the Court’s Instruction No. 13 outlined the

claim of defamation as having only three elements, as follows:
In order to prove a claim of defamation, the Plaintiff,

Duane Siercke has

the burden of

proving each of the following elements:

1.

The Defendant Analli

Siercke,

nka

Plaintiff Duane Siercke to others;

2.

The information imputed

Salla,

communicated information concerning the

and

that Plaintiff Duane Siercke

had committed a crime; and

The information was

3.

(R., p. 133).

Instruction

The Court

false.

therefore did not require elements 4, 5 and 6 0f Idaho Civil Jury

on defamation. including

should have

known

that

it

was

that: (4)

false; (5)

The

The defendant knew

it

was

false, or

plaintiff suffered actual injury

defamation; and (6) the amount 0f damages suffered by the

plaintiff.

reasonably

because of the

IDJI 4.82

Additionally, the Court did not instruct the jury on bad faith or malice requirements for
Plaintiff to establish his defamation claim

had the court afforded Salla

at least a

qualiﬁed

privilege. (R. p. 133).

Further,

and notwithstanding

misdemeanor domestic
that the

that Salla reported to police that her

battery, that Siercke

husband had committed

was charged with misdemeanor domestic

Court instructed 0n misdemeanor domestic battery and

it

battery,

being a crime, the Court gave

the jury a defamation per se instruction. (R. 127, 129). Salla objected t0 the instruction.

The

Court gave the instruction. Siercke did not have t0 prove damages. The jury awarded Siercke

$25,000 pursuant to the court’s erroneous instructions.

4.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Salla’s appeal

trial

to

this

Judgment and the

trial

judge’s denial of her motion for a

new

presents this Court With three issues. First and foremost, Whether reports 0f criminal activity

law enforcement,

civil

from

their agents,

and prosecutors,

like those

made by

Salla here, are subj ect t0

defamation claims and/or whether an absolute or qualiﬁed privilege should be applied to

such statements. Second, whether the

trial

minimum

faith

require a

instruct the jury

new trial. And

instruction

where

on the bad

court’s failure t0 afford an absolute privilege or, at a

and malice requirements 0f a qualiﬁed

ﬁnally, whether Siercke

Salla’s report t0

was

entitled t0 a

privilege,

defamation per se jury

law enforcement involved only misdemeanor domestic battery

and resulted

allegations,

in

misdemeanor charges not

him being charged with only misdemeanor domestic

subj ect t0 charging

by information 0r indictment

battery

as required

Where

by Idaho

precedent.

5.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review as t0 questions of law. Kaai Farms, Inc.

v.

Longstreet,

121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992).

Whether jury

instructions

have been correctly given

is

a question of law. Ballard

160 Idaho 674, 702, 378 P.3d 464, 492 (2016), quoting Mackay

v.

v.

Kerr,

Four Rivers Packing

C0.,

151

Idaho 388, 391, 257 P.3d 755, 758 (201 1).”When considering Whether a jury instruction
should or should not have been given, the Court considers ‘whether there
to support the instruction,

When error is

committed

and whether the instruction
in the giving

“the jury instructions, taken as a

391, 257 P.3d at 758.
affect the

new trial

is

trial.”

evidence

at trial

a correct statement 0f the law."

of a jury instruction,

it

will be reversible error

Id.

Where

whole mislead 0r prejudice a party.” Mackay, 151 Idaho

A jury instruction is prejudicial When

outcome 0f the

is

Garcia

v.

it

at

“could have affected or did

Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 P.2d 819 (2007).

A

should be granted where the party demonstrates that the error affected the jury’s

conclusion. Ballard, 160 Idaho 674, 702, 378 P.3d 464, 492 (2016).

burden t0 clearly show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury

The appellant bears

instruction.

Clark

the

v.

Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 159, 45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002).

6.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

An individual’s

statements t0 law enforcement and prosecutors during investigation 0f

criminal activity are entitled t0 absolute immunity such that an action in defamation cannot be

brought.

At a minimum, qualiﬁed immunity should be afforded

Plaintiff faces a higher

such statements so that the

burden of proof and/or more stringent elements

defamation claim, including bad

An individual

t0

against

faith

to

prove in his

and malice.

Whom a claim 0f misdemeanor domestic battery has been made is

not entitled to a defamation per se jury instruction 0n his defamation claim and must instead be
required to prove his damages. Here, the Defendant did not prove his damages and the jury’s

award

that

was based upon

The

trial

the defamation per se jury instruction

court’s errors in interpreting the

incorrectly require a reversal of the

law relating

Judgment and remand

must be reversed.

to defamation, instructing the jury

for a decision consistent with this

Court’s direction 0n application 0f either absolute or qualiﬁed privileges to statements

law enforcement and prosecutors.

Salla t0

7.

made by

ARGUMENT
a.

Siercke’s Defamation Claims were Barred

by an Absolute Privilege

Statements that form the basis of a complaint t0 law enforcement and prosecutors should

be deemed the ﬁrst step in a judicial proceeding and such statements should be afforded absolute

immunity from a defamation claim by the person against

Malmin

v.

whom such statements were made.

See,

Engler, 124 Idaho 733, 736, (Ct. App. 1993) (“defamatory matter published in the

due course of a judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation t0 the cause,
privileged”) quoting Richeson

v.

§

586 (1977). See

also,

1996)(citizens and law enforcement have a

Richmond v. Nodlan, 552

common interest in investigating

criminal activity and the discussion 0f potential suspects 0f criminal activity

common interest).

absolutely

Kessler,73 Idaho 548, 551-52, 255 P.2d 707, 709 (1953),

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
N.W.2d 586 (N.D.

is

is

relevant to that

The Ninth

Circuit established this this important privilege in reviewing a defamation

claim alleged t0 have occurred
788,

(9th Cir.

at

a public meeting in Lewiston, Idaho.

Borg v Boas, 231 F.2d

—

1956) While the Borg case involved a different underlying factual scenario

newspaper’s reports relating t0 criminal allegations against public ofﬁcials

-

a

the case established

important precedent in Idaho in the context 0f defamation claims stemming from criminal
allegations t0 public ofﬁcials:

hornbook learning

and utterances in judicial proceedings so
concerned and preliminary steps leading
t0 judicial action of an ofﬁcial nature have been given absolute privilege. Of
particular interest are proceedings leading up t0 prosecutions or attempted
prosecutions for crime. The common law placed a veil of secrecy about the
proceedings 0f a grand jury, so that all persons might freely disclose their
suspicions and deductions Without the danger 0f a libel suit as a result of an
attempt at law enforcement. But a written charge or information ﬁled with the
prosecutor 0r the court is not libelous although proved to be false and unfounded.
Furthermore, the information given to a prosecutor by a private person for
the purpose 0f initiating a prosecution is protected by the same cloak of
immunity and cannot be used as a basis for an action for defamation.
It is

that the actions

far as the actual participants therein are

Id. at

794

(9th Cir.

1956) (emphasis added).

An absolute privilege rule for private persons who report crimes to law enforcement and
prosecutors regarding criminal activity

See Mazanderan

App. 3d 421, 54

v.

Ill.

Harvester C0,, 184

is

followed in several jurisdictions in the United States.

McGranery, 490 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C. 1984); McCutcheon

Dec. 913, 425 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (lst Dist. 1981); Stames
111.

App. 3d 199, 132

111.

Ina, 902 F. Supp. 814, 820

664 N.E.2d 650, 655

2014

WL 641933

(Ill.

(ND.

Ill.

1995);Vincent

v.

(lst Dist. 1996); Belluomz'm'

App.

Ct. lst Dist.

v.

Moran, 99

Ill.

International

Dec. 566, 539 N.E.2d 1372, 1374—75 (4th Dist.

1989)(communications to federal law enforcement ofﬁcials); Bradley

13,

v.

Williams, 279

v.

Zarjyczny,

v.

Ill.

Avis Rental Car System,

App. 3d

2014 IL App

1,

216

(lst)

Ill.

Dec.

122664,

2014)(a complaint t0 the Chicago police superintendent

for purpose 0f instituting criminal charges involved a ranking ofﬁcial with quasi-judicial

functions and

was

entitled to absolute privilege);

Department, 746 Fed.

Apr.

Shea

v.

Winnebago County Sheriﬂ's

541, 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2018),

cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 1200

(2019)(applying the Illinois rule of absolute privilege in an alleged sibling dispute over control of

an elderly mother and her

estate,

a criminal battery claim against plaintiff-brother, together With

a charge of theft of keys to plaintiff‘s mother's house and commission 0f a hit-and-run offense
against a caregiver t0 the mother); Illaraza

2014); Savoy

v.

v.

HOVENSA LLC,

Univ. ofAkron, 2014-Ohi0-3043, 15

(2015), appeal denied, 498 Mich. 951, 872

absolute privilege rule

535-36, 15

S. Ct.

was

for the

supreme court 0r

WL 5859168,

N.E.3d 430, 435, 307 Ed.

(Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. Franklin County 2014); Eddington

N.W.2d 394

2014

v.

15-16 (D.V.I.

Law Rep.
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Torrez, 3 11 Mich. App. 198, 874

N.W.2d 474 (2015) (any change

legislature). In re Quarles,

in the

158 U.S. 532,

959, 39 L. Ed. 1080 (1895)(every private citizen has a constitutional right to

inform executive ofﬁcers of charges 0f criminality; such communications are absolutely
privileged under the law of defamation); Pawlowski

41-42 (1991); Pennoyer
2004); Marina

v.

v.

v.

Smorto, 403 Pa. Super. 71, 588 A.2d 36,

Marriott Hotel Services, Ina, 324 F. Supp. 2d 614, 616-19 (E.D. Pa.

Fava, 915 A. 2d 121, 122—24 (Pa. Super. 2006)(f0110wing Pawloskz', the court

extended an absolute privilege for complaints t0 police ofﬁcers about criminal charges to
applications to mental health ofﬁcials for an involuntary commitment);

F.

Supp. 2d 1182, 1201 (D. Nev. 2009); Vogel

Ed. 158 (1884); Cutts

Bergman

v.

v.

v.

C0.,

505 So. 2d 121

1,

Young

& Rubicam,

V. Bailey,

Gibbons, 649
S. Ct. 12,

28 L.

1215 (Ala. 1987);

Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 221 N.W.2d 898, 902 (1974); McGranahan

v.

v.

Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 315-16, 4

American United Life Ins.

N.H. 758, 408 A.2d 121, 127—28 (1979); Frazier

Abrahams

Mazzeo

v.

957 F.2d 920, 932—33

Dakar, 119
(lst Cir. 1992);

Ina, 79 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 1996), (statements t0 the IRS and

U.S. Attorney's ofﬁce were absolutely privileged); Restatement (Second) 0f Torts § 598,

comm.

e (1977) ("formal or informal complaints t0 a prosecuting attorney or other

law enforcement

ofﬁcer concerning Violations of the criminal law are absolutely privileged" under § 587,

Restatement (Second) 0f Torts
t0 "information

§ 587,

comm. b (1977)

given and informal complaints

made

(the absolute privilege

of a party applied

t0 a prosecuting attorney or other proper

ofﬁcer preliminary t0 a proposed criminal prosecution Whether or not the information

by a formal complaint or
898 P.2d 179 (Okla.

Ct.

afﬁdavit"); Presson

App. Div.

v.

Bill

infra);

Beckman

3 1995) (letter sent t0

C0,, Ina,

1995

IRS alleging tax

is

followed

OK CIV APP 44,

fraud), cert. denied

(1995).

California has routinely applied absolute immunity to these situations. See Devis

ofAmerica, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1002, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238, 242 (2d
adopted a good

faith limitation).

But compare Williams

Rptr. 423, 427-28 (3d Dist. 1982) (disagreed With

223 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 273 Cal. Rptr. 367 (4th

v.

v.

Bank

Dist. 1998) (in dicta the court

Taylor, 129 Cal. App. 3d 745, 181 Cal.

and questioned by Fenelon

Dist. 1990));

Passman

v.

v.

Superior Court,

Tarkan, 34 Cal. App.

4th 607, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 291, 296 (2d Dist. 1995) (following Williams and rejecting Fenelon)
(the court

was

interpreting an absolute statutory privilege accorded to "any other ofﬁcial

proceeding authorized by law"). Recently, the court issuing Fenelon has repudiated

it

and

adopted the absolute privilege rule 0f Williams and progeny. Most notable in the context of this
appeal, the California Court of Appeals in Navarette

v.

Holland, issued a superseding opinion

holding that statements by a claimed spousal abuse Victim to police overheard by a neighbor

were absolutely privileged. 4

Where

Cal. Rptr.

3d 702, 76 P.3d 363

(Cal. 2003).

the defendant ofﬁcially swears out a criminal complaint, that complaint

absolutely privileged under the judicial proceedings rule. O’Connell

App.

Ct. 416,

640 N.E.2d 513, 517 (1994); Remzey

v.

State,

v.

was

Bank ofBoston, 37 Mass.

174 Misc. 2d 523, 665 N.Y.s.2d

10

1005, 1008 (Ct. C1. 1997) (the court distinguished cases involving information given a district

attorney,

where only a qualiﬁed privilege

33 1, 766 A.2d 1206, 1209—10, 15 1 Ed.

applied); Pitts

Law Rep. 517

v.

Newark Bd. 0fEduc., 337

N.J. Super.

(App. DiV. 2001) (a ﬁled criminal trespass

complaint was absolutely privileged).
This View, considered the minority rule, treats the formal complaint or informal charge 0f

crime to a prosecuting attorney, police, coroner 0r IRS as the

"initial step"

—comparable

to

appearance before a grand jury—and "an integral part of the regular course ofjustice." See

Bergman

Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 221 N.W.2d 898, 901—02 (1974)

v.

(the court

gave an absolute

privilege as to statement t0 an assistant district attorney but opined that statements to police

were

only qualiﬁedly privileged—the court noted that a prosecutor's discretion t0 prosecute or not
"approaches the quasi-judicial");

(1979).

McGranahan

v.

Dakar, 119 N.H. 758, 408 A.2d 121, 128

Such reports are “statements preliminary”

Hotel Services, Ina, 324

F.

The qualiﬁed privilege

to judicial proceedings.

Pennoyer

v.

Marriott

Supp. 2d 614, 619 (ED. Pa. 2004).
rule has

been

rej ected in

circumstances such as those presented in this

case because of the risk that even "honest litigants Will be put to trouble, time and expense in

defending themselves against vexatious lawsuits," thereby deterring citizens from making even

good

faith allegations

of criminality. McGranahan

(1979). In light 0f the criminal penalties for

0f other

tort

v.

making

Dahar, 119 N.H. 758, 408 A.2d 121, 128

false ofﬁcial statements

remedies—abuse 0f process and malicious prosecution —in

and the

at least

availability

some egregious

cases, "the substantial interest of society in encouraging citizens to report suspected criminal

activity" "far outweigh[s]" complainant's reputational interest. Id.

the absolute privilege rule t0 reports of sexual assault to

institution.

See Razavi

v.

Walkuski, 2016 IL

App

(lst)

Limited case law has extended

campus police

151435, 404

Ill.

at

a private educational

Dec. 156, 55 N.E.3d 252,

11

256-58, 332 Ed.

Law Rep.

deterring Victims”

1087 (App.

Ct. 1st Dist. 2016)(the court cited the “chilling effect

by any other policy and could not discern any

of

legitimate policy in not

allowing the same immunity merely because alleged Victims chose to contact campus security
rather than city police).

In this case, Siercke brought a civil tort claim in defamation against Salla for her having

reported his domestic abuse. His argument at

trial

focused 0n her reports t0 law enforcement and

prosecutors and the impact of his subsequenty being charged with a misdemeanor domestic
battery. (Tr. Siercke, 45-48, 55-64).

Salla argued that she

set forth in her

motion

Idaho case law 0n

t0 the

was

entitled t0 absolute

Court relating t0 jury instructions.

this particular issue relating to

law enforcement and prosecutors, Salla cited
Idaho 384, 114 P. 42 (191

1) in

to

Carpenter

.

114

v.

With

the paucity of

Grimes Pass Placer Mining

which the Supreme Court pronounced

material matter in a judicial proceeding. .holding

is

(R., p. 93).

as speciﬁcally

defamation claims stemming from reports to

and the public good can best be served by allowing

which

immunity from such claim

litigants to freely

C0,, 19

that “the ends ofjustice

plead any pertinent 0r

them accountable only

for defamatory matter

neither pertinent nor material to the subj ect under inquiry.” Id. 19 Idaho 384, at 393-95,

P. 42, at 45-47.

The

district court

ignored this claim 0f privilege and allowed the defamation

claim t0 proceed t0 jury verdict.
In her motion for a

new trial,

Salla cited to

Borg

further authority for her claim of absolute privilege

rej ected

v.

Boas, 231 F.2d 788

and demand for a new

(9th Cir.

trial.

The court

her claim by distinguishing her claim from Dickenson Frozen Foods, Inc.

Company 164 Idaho 669,434 P.3d 1275
t0 statements

made by

1956) as

v.

J.R. Simplot

(2019), a case applying the absolute litigation privilege

a business in a federal civil complaint. (R., p. 168-170). In

its

order

12

denying the motion for new

trial,

the Court provided

more squarely on point, did not apply
Salla submits that she

was

t0 the facts

n0 explanation a

of this case.

entitled to absolute privilege

to

why the Borg case,

(R., p. 165-173).

on the statements she made

enforcement and prosecutors regarding Siercke’s domestic Violence and the

trial

to

law

court erred in

permitting the claim to go to the jury.

b.

Alternatively, at a

minimum,

Salla’s reports t0

Law Enforcement & Prosecutors

about Siercke’s domestic violence were entitled t0 a Qualiﬁed Privilege

Even

if this

Court determines that an absolute privilege

is

not warranted under the

circumstances of this case, this Court should, at a minimum, follow the maj ority ofjurisdictions
in the United States that recognize the important public policy in affording a qualiﬁed privilege

for statements

made

to

law enforcement and prosecutors during the investigation of criminal

activity.

Even applying
to

the less protective “qualiﬁed

immunity” standard

to Appellant’s statement

law enforcement about her ex-husband’s domestic Violence against her would necessarily

require a higher standard of proof than

was applied

in this case

and the element of bad

faith

and

malice.

For example, in the leading case the
to a district attorney

and a

New York Court 0f Appeals held that oral

later afﬁdavit proffered

only qualiﬁedly privileged. Taker

v.

Pollak, 44

167—69 (1978). While acknowledging

that

statements

under threat of a grand jury subpoena were

N.Y.2d 21 1, 405 N.Y.S.2d

1,

376 N.E.2d 163,

an appearance before a grand jury would be

absolutely privileged, the court held that a district attorney functioning in the capacity of
recipient of charges of crime does not function as a judicial ofﬁcial but as the equivalent of a

police ofﬁcer. Id. 167-168.

It

concluded that a qualiﬁed privilege sufﬁced "t0 foster the public

13

purpose 0f encouraging citizens to come forth With information concerning criminal activity" and
opined that "[o]nly those

who

act out

of malice, rather than public interest need hesitate before

speaking." Id. at 168.

In another,

more recent

fabricated charge 0f murder

detect

who would be

the

by

Supreme Court held

v.

S.W.2d 43 1, 433—36 (Tenn.

Ct.

Abrahamsen v Mountain

malice, or malice in fact,

is

v.

A qualiﬁed privilege is lost when

1113, citing Walker

"

for only a

see

good

States Telephone

&

v.

to a 10-

v.

it is

and Without

demonstrated that “the

Remie Jaussaud

Tel. C0.,

faith

International Harvester, 95 Idaho

was made “With express malice.”

& Associates, Inc.

Moore

unjustiﬁed hostility.”).

standard, information supplied in

publication of the defamatory material”

951;

stress analyzer t0

App. 1981)(rejecting absolute privilege as

proven malice, Will not support a defamation claim. Barlow
881, 522 P.2d 1102 (1974).

therein—a

And

Fridovich, 598 So. 2d 65, 68—69 (Fla. 1992).

Under a qualiﬁed privilege

at

him and use 0f a

the family of plaintiff against

year pattern 0f complaints based 0n a "history of

522 P.2d

that the facts

most convincing liar—constituted an "eloquent argumen

qualiﬁed privilege. Fridovich
Bailey, 628

case, the Florida

Id.

at 892,

& Assoc, 497 P.2d 949, at

494 P.2d 1287

the publication of defamatory matter in

95 Idaho

bad

at 1289.

faith,

“Express

without belief in

the truth 0f the matter published, 0r With reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the matter.”

Id. at

892, 1114. Further, “the determination of whether a given set 0f facts constitutes a

‘privileged occasion,’ in regard t0 liability for defamation,

is

a matter 0f law for the

determination 0f the court,” which must then instruct the jury accordingly.

Id.

“The question 0f

Whether the publication was actuated by express malice, and the privilege thereby nulliﬁed,
question for the jury.”

Id. citing,

Browder

v.

Cook, 59 F.Supp. 225, 231 (D. Idaho 1944).

therefore erroneous for the Court t0 take the question of malice

from the jury.

is

a

It is

Id.
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Here, the Court’s Instruction No. 10 in Which

it

set forth the

elements the Plaintiff was

required t0 prove t0 establish his defamation claim contained no malice element, nor any bad
faith 0r reckless disregard for the truth element.

The Court therefore

failed to afford the

Defendant even the minimal qualiﬁed privilege which the majority ofjurisdictions in the United
States afford Defendants facing similar defamation claims. (R., p. 13

Indeed, the

and

failed to

even

instruction. ICJI

trial

1).

court in this case provided a defamation instruction with only 3 elements

elements in the Idaho Civil Jury Instruction form defamation

set forth the

which requires

that six (6) elements

be proven. Speciﬁcally, IDJI 4.82 requires:

In order t0 prove a claim of defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving

each 0f the following elements;

The defendant communicated information concerning

1.

and

others;

The information impugned the honesty,

2.

0f the

plaintiff or

4.
it

was

false;

plaintiff to public hatred,

6.

The Court’s

and

instructions in this case instead required only that the Plaintiff prove that: (1)

The Defendant Analli

nka

Siercke,

t0 others; (2)

Salla,

communicated information concerning the

The information imputed

committed a crime; and

(3) information

case cut out elements 4,

5,

critical fourth

contempt or ridicule; and

The plaintiff suffered actual injury because 0f the defamation; and
The amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff.

5.

Duane Siercke

exposed the

integrity, Virtue or reputation

The information was false; and
The defendant knew it was false, or reasonably should have known

3.

that

the plaintiff t0

and

false.

(R., p. 133).

The Court’s

had

instructions in this

Even

if a

defamation per se instruction was appropriate, the

intent.

The

Plaintiff in this case

6.

element concerns

was

that Plaintiff Duane Siercke

Plaintiff

Defendant’s intent — a

critical

require the plaintiff t0

show malice

was not required

t0

show

the

element in every defamation claim. Additionally, the Court did not
or bad faith which elements were essential if Salla

was

entitled to a qualiﬁed privilege.
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Ultimately, with only the 3 elements to consider, the jury decision for Plaintiff was

substantially easier

and actually resulted

error can be described in

in the jury

ﬁnding for the

Plaintiff

n0 other way than as misleading and prejudicing

his claims. This

Salla.

have affected and did affect the outcome 0f the

instructions in this case could

this case affected the jury’s

on

made

The jury

trial.

The

error in

conclusion because they were not held t0 the correct elements of the

law 0f defamation, nor instructed according

to

any privilege that should have been afforded

t0

Salla’s reports.

Plaintiff was not entitled t0 a

c.

Plaintiff alleged that

by

enforcement and prosecutors —

committed defamation per
defamation per

On

calling 91

all

Defamation Per Se Instruction

1,

reporting the crime of domestic battery to law

of Which led t0 his

se. Plaintiff

arrest

and prosecution, the Defendant

ﬁled proposed jury instructions following the law 0f

se.

June 20, 2018, the Defendant ﬁled her written obj ections to the instructions

proposed by

Plaintiff. (R., p.

proposed instruction numbered

92-97). Speciﬁcally, the Defendant objected t0 Plaintiff s

2,

10 and 12 relating t0 defamation per se as follows:

which are not appropriate under the
upon Which he now proposes t0 narrowly focus his slander claim. Plaintiff s
claim focuses 0n Defendant’s statements t0 law enforcement and prosecutors in their
pursuit of criminal charges against the Plaintiff. The charges were initiated by law
enforcement after both parties called 911 0n March 7, 2016. Defendant’s statements
Plaintiff proposes slander per se instructions
facts

in the context

of the domestic Violence judicial proceedings are subject to an absolute

litigation privilege.

(1d,, at 93).

Over Defendant’s

objections,

precedent on this issue, the

The

trial

and notwithstanding Idaho and Ninth Circuit

court nonetheless gave Instruction No.6:

Plaintiff Duane Siercke is entitled t0

prove damages

if false

statements

an award 0f damages Without having to

made by Analli

Siercke,

nka

Salla, impute that
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the Plaintiff Duane Siercke engaged in a criminal offense.” (Jury Instruction

No.

6).

(R., p. 127).

Moreover, even as
that absolute

to that portion

immunity did not

attach,

0f Plaintiff” s claims t0 Which

it

could be argued

such as statements t0 a school counselor 0r friends,

the civil

claim of defamation per se requires that the statement uttered alleges a felony. At the jury
instructions conference,

Defendant reminded the

court to the recent case ofIrz'sh

clear that t0

be defamatory per

criminal offense chargeable

battery uttered

this Court’s

deﬁned

as

by

As

court 0f this important point and cited the

Hall, 163 Idaho 603,

v.

se, the

416 P.3d 975 (2018). That case made

conduct alleged must “impute conduct constituting a

by indictment or by information.” Id.

at

607, 979.

The domestic

the Defendant and squarely at issue in this case as set forth speciﬁcally in

jury instruction No. 8 provided that

in section 18-903, Idaho

result in traumatic injury is guilty

makes

trial

a battery,

Code, against another household member Which does not

of misdemeanor battery.”

clear that the proof before the jury

a matter of law, a

“A household member Who commits

was an

(R., p. 129).

This instruction

allegation 0f misdemeanor domestic battery.

misdemeanor allegation cannot

constitute defamation per se.

court erred in giving the defamation per se instruction and the judgment

The

trial

must be reversed and a

new trial ordered.
Notwithstanding Defendant’s written and oral objections t0 a defamation per se
instruction, the trial court

wrong 0n

gave

this

erroneous instruction to the jury. The

trial

court

was

the law and this error established an incorrect burden of proof and permitted a

verdict t0 be entered that

was not supported by

the law.

The Defendant was not required

to

prove damages, did not prove damages constituting $25,000 and the jury awarded damages
17

in the

jury

amount of $25,000 because 0f this erroneous

is

reversable and requires a

instruction. This error in instructing the

new trial.

Conclusion

8.

Allowing a private

Plaintiff Who has

been charged with criminal offense

citizen has reported their criminal conduct to

law enforcement and prosecutors

after a private

to bring civil

defamation claims against the private citizen reporter will have a dramatic chilling effect on the
administration of criminal justice in Idaho.

Idaho precedent and a substantial number of other jurisdictions around the country
support the application of an absolute privilege to private citizens reports to law enforcement and
prosecutors about criminal activity t0 Which they are a witness and/or Victim.
privilege

would bar the exact type 0f lawsuit brought against

Violence, in this case.

The maj ority

Salla, a Victim

An absolute

0f domestic

ofjurisdictions in this country provide for at least a qualiﬁed

privilege concerning such reports and require Plaintiffs to establish that the reports

bad

faith

were made

in

and With malice.

The

trial

court in this case extended n0 privilege t0 Salla’s statements t0 police and

prosecutors and critically erred in instructing the jury by requiring the Plaintiff t0 only establish
3 elements

and Without requiring the

Defendant’ s

Plaintiff demonstrate, malice,

bad

faith,

0r even the

intent.

Finally,

by

instructing the jury according t0 a defamation per se instruction, the Court

ignored the requirement that a felony, chargeable by indictment 0r information, need be the
subj ect matter of the statementto qualify for a defamation per se instruction, if such instruction

were otherwise appropriate

These

in cases involving reports t0

law enforcement and prosecutors.

critical errors in the trial court’s instructions t0 the jury,

taken as a Whole, misled

18

0r prejudiced Salla. Requiring a jury t0 only

ﬁnd

3

0f the 6 elements 0f a claim and refusing t0

afford a privilege that the law recognizes and reﬂect that privilege in instructions to the jury

most

certainly affected the

outcome 0f the

trial in this case.

Salla has therefore

met her burden

0f establishing that the instructions could have affected or did affect the outcome of the

There can be n0 question that
this case to

ﬁnd

diminished burden

for the Plaintiff on his defamation claim

was awarded. This
Dated

this

prejudicial error requires reversal

this 25th

made

it

trial.

far easier for the jury in

and award the $25,000 verdict

and remand for a new

trial in this

that

matter.

day 0f February, 2020.
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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